Character and excuses

Normally there are two conditions for holding someone morally responsible: the freedom condition and the understanding condition. If my freedom was impaired, this might act as a (partial) excuse, and allow me to avoid responsibility (blame). An epileptic would have a clear excuse for any damage caused by a seizure. A person’s character is a set of dispositions to regularly perceive, to deliberate, to feel, and to act in certain ways. This sounds like it might constrain that person’s freedom, and if so, then it might serve as an excuse to deflect blame. But this is counter-intuitive: imagine a security guard who claims that he was ‚constrained‘ by his cowardice, and ran away during the bank robbery. Normally we do not hesitate to blame people for their cowardice, or at least for failing to subdue their cowardly impulses. I want to explore this tension, especially in the context of collaboration with an authoritarian state.